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Abstract:
One of the foremost controversies apparent following the 2011 intervention in 
Libya, was the outcome of regime change. Critics charge the facilitation of the 
Gadaffi regime's overthrow was not justifiable under the United Nations mandate, 
not justifiable under the prominent 'Responsibility to Protect' norm and may have 
undermined efforts to resolve the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. However, 
it is asserted  that in situations where intervention  is undertaken to stop atrocities 
committed by a government, the removal of that regime is necessary in achieving 
its  aims.  In exploring this  link between humanitarian intervention and regime 
change, this piece analyses how the academic literature can justify the enactment 
of regime change in instances of intervention. This relationship otherwise lacks a 
sustained  analysis  in  the  academic  literature.  Whilst  regime  change  is  often 
difficult  to  justify  in  instances  of  humanitarian  intervention,  and  inevitably 
controversial,  this  analysis will  demonstrate that it  is also often a necessity in 
achieving an intervention's humanitarian goals.
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Humanitarian intervention has a tendency to produce intensely polarising debate. Aside from the 
broader legal, moral and political issues, one particularly polarising issue is rhetoric or enaction of 
regime change. As David Rieff saliently demonstrates, however much advocates of humanitarian 
intervention attempt to detach the concept from the contentious issue of regime change, they are 
inexplicably linked (2008). In the political fallout following the Iraq War, foreign imposed regime 
change has been viewed as a toxic concept in international relations. This issue is now clearly 
relevant in debates over humanitarian intervention, following the controversy surrounding the 
overthrow of the Gadaffi regime in 2011, under its auspices. These issues raise questions regarding 
the relationship between humanitarian intervention and regime change, as well as the emerging 
'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) norm.
When looking at examples of humanitarian intervention, the vast majority encompassed some form 
of regime change. Libya & Ivory Coast in 2012 and Haiti in 1994 witnessed the clear removal of 
the existing authorities. Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor represented secessionist campaigns, which 
arguably represents regime change. Somalia 1992 and Iraq 1991 did not see regime change occur 
(the former because there was no regime to change). In high profile calls for intervention, regarding 
Darfur in the mid-2000's and Cyclone Nargis in Burma 2007, there was a demand for regime 
change, alongside accusations of crimes against humanity in both cases (Udombana, 2005; 
Economist, 2009). Furthermore, ongoing discussion of the situation in Syria is replete with similar 
calls for the removal of the Assad regime (Reuters, 2013).
An addressal of this implicit link would contribute to theoretical perspectives on such a contentious 
issue for humanitarian intervention. As Rieff shows, if the decision to intervene in a humanitarian 
crisis is the result of negative actions by local authorities, then logically the removal of these 
authorities is a necessary determinant of any successful intervention (2008). However, the recent 
facilitation of regime change in Libya and the Ivory Coast have demonstrated the controversy that 
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inevitably surrounds these outcomes (Bellamy, 2011). The issue of regime change has lacked a 
sustained addressal in the academic literature. This is important, as if it is a 'necessary determinant' 
of humanitarian intervention, exploring how regime change can be justified by dominant theory and 
the R2P doctrine is crucial for advancing the theoretical debate regarding perceptions of 
interventions like Libya. This thesis seeks to answer the question: 'How can regime change be 
justified in discourses of humanitarian intervention?' 
In answering this question, it is recognised that there are numerous forms of justification relevant to 
humanitarian intervention (ethical, legal, political). This piece focuses on the justifying standards 
purported in the academic literature and R2P, and it will be assessed how regime change can be 
justifiable for scholars of humanitarian intervention. 
This work will focus on the 2011 intervention in Libya, which witnessed a clear outcome of regime 
change. This case is suitable, as it was the first clear example of humanitarian intervention since the 
Iraq War, where imposed regime change and its conflation with post-facto humanitarian 
justifications damaged political will and support for the concept of humanitarian intervention This 
is poignant, as there has been a similar controversy following the application of regime change in 
Libya (Luck, 2011). This was also the first case of humanitarian intervention since the adoption of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principles in 2005, thus it can be assessed whether references to 
the principles justified intervention and regime change. By choosing a case where regime change 
occurred, this study is better able to answer the research question by analysing, in depth, the 
discourse surrounding regime change in this intervention.
A sustained analysis of how regime change is perceived in the academic literature makes a clear 
theoretical contribution on an issue of significance to the concept. This significance is demonstrated 
by several factors: Firstly, following the removal of the Gadaffi regime in Libya, the issue of regime 
change in humanitarian intervention became pronounced, being cited in discussion of not only that 
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case (Zenko, 2011), but a potential intervention in Syria (Luck, 2011). Secondly, despite this issue 
being raised, following both the Libyan intervention and following the Iraq War, the potential 
occurrence of regime change in instances of humanitarian intervention has not received a sustained 
analysis (Bellamy, 2011: 22). This emphasises the topicality of this issue, and relevance of the case 
study, in the midst of the current debate.  
In analysing this link between humanitarian intervention and regime change, this piece analyses 
how regime change can be justified according to the academic literature, and applying these 
perspectives to the case study. This analysis makes a contribution to theoretical debates following 
the Libyan intervention, as Bellamy notes regime changes in the Ivory Coast and Libya has created 
a problem for advocates of intervention (2011). Referencing international criticism of their 
subsequent, indirect prevention of an international response to the crisis in Syria, he asserts, “it is 
incumbent on us to explore the relationship more deeply in order to ascertain whether there are 
ways of maintaining a clear distinction between R2P and regime change” (Ibid). By analysing when 
regime change is justifiable and unjustifiable in instances of humanitarian intervention, a distinction 
can be made between the principles put forward by R2P and regime change like that practised in 
Iraq.
The analysis can contribute to wider theoretical discussions of humanitarian intervention, with the 
prominence of this issue amply demonstrated by the controversy following the intervention in 
Libya. As a result, this study may facilitate further research on the connotations such a controversial 
issue may have for humanitarian intervention, such as the legality of regime change in instances of 
intervention, a debate raised in Libya on whether the UN resolution authorised an outcome of 
regime change (Ulfstein & Christiansen: 2013). More generally, further analysis on this issue could 
establish how regime change influences the likelihood of 'success' in instances of intervention. 
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Concepts
It is important before continuing, to define the concepts which will be being referred to. When 
defining humanitarian intervention, it is crucial to distinguish it from humanitarian aid or traditional 
peace-building, instead referring to the “forcible military intervention in humanitarian crises” 
(Farell, 2010: 309). Weiss argues two principles must be met for a military intervention to be 
appropriately termed as a 'humanitarian intervention', that is: unsolicited, against the wishes of a 
government, or without meaningful consent (Weiss, 2012: 7), and with a clear humanitarian motive 
for intervening (Weiss, 2012: 6). Acceptable humanitarian motives are restricted to ending atrocities 
in dominant perspectives, be they large-scale losses of life, or ethnic cleansing (ICISS, 2001: XII).
This definition therefore distinguishes humanitarian intervention from regime change. The 
discussion of regime change in this paper is not referring to it as a theoretical concept, but as an 
event. Broadly, this can be defined as the replacement of one regime (local authority or 
government) with another. Mahoney and Snyder show “regimes are the formal and informal 
institutions that structure political interaction, and a change of regime occurs when actors 
reconfigure these institutions” (Snyder & Mahoney, 1999: 103). Through this definition, one 
identifies clear examples of regime change like Libya, and also demonstrates secessionist conflicts 
like Kosovo represent regime change, as the institutional arrangements were reconfigured whereby 
Serbia no longer had authority.
The next section presents the research methodology utilised in answering the research question, and 
how it will be applied in analysis. 
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Research Methods
This research utilises qualitative research methods, in particular in-depth analysis of the case study 
and discourse/text analysis. These methods are particularly appropriate in answering this question, 
as approaching the research question requires 'thick' analysis of the academic literature, including 
the identification of key themes and perspectives on regime change.
The research framework utilised will be discourse analysis, where analysis of the literature is 
connected to broader themes in the social sciences (Vromen 2010: 264). Discourse analysis has 
been previously utilised in analysis of humanitarian intervention, examples being Chandler's 
analysis of the evolution of 'ethical foreign policy' (2006: 53-88), or Bellamy's analysis of a 
growing R2P discourse (2009: 113). The methodology utilised here is more appropriate in 
addressing the research question, being focussed on identifying discourses in the academic literature 
which may justify regime change, which are then applied to the case study.
The strength of this approach is the ability to identify limitations in current perspectives, which can 
challenge dominant theoretical positions (Vromen, 2010: 264). The limited addressal of regime 
change in the academic literature presents a solid opportunity for such analysis. This interpretivist 
approach is effective in not merely focussing on texts and primary sources alone, but situating these 
statements or analysis in broader theoretical frameworks, as theory is not a tool, but object for study 
in itself (Campbell, 2007: 218). Furthermore, as statements and 'discourses' of relevant actor are 
highly relevant in analysing how foreign policy decisions are formed, focussing on these discourses 
is appropriate in this case (Bevir et al, 2012: 4). This explicative analysis is necessary for the case 
study, where the justification to enact regime change in Libya is a focus of analysis. 
This method draws conclusions from the literature by linking empirical events (i.e. regime change) 
to scholarly discourses of humanitarian intervention. In executing the analysis, this piece will first 
identify the thematic discussions and discourses of regime change in humanitarian intervention in a 
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substantive review of the literature. This analysis will be used to establish criteria to assess the 
justifiability of regime change, which can then be applied to the case study, to test these theories.
A second method utilised is an in-depth case study on the Libyan intervention. This method allows 
theoretical positions of situations where regime change is justified to be tested, in-doing so 
establishing whether the Libyan intervention can be justified by R2P principles and in dominant 
theory. By applying and testing theoretical assumptions, the strength and validity of standards of 
acceptable and justifiable applications of regime change can be tested. The topicality of the Libyan 
case in leading to wider discussion of regime change in humanitarian intervention makes it an ideal 
candidate for analysis. With the use of case studies, there is a risk that the evidence gathered cannot 
be overly generalised, a factor which will be taken into account. Additionally, there is the question 
of selection bias, as Libya had a clear outcome of regime change. On this issue, as Bennett and 
Elman state, “reasons for choosing cases on the basis of outcomes may well outweigh the risks of 
that particular bias,” (2006: 462) thus analysing a case study with outcomes of relevance to this 
research question can produce strong analysis of how regime change was justified.
Regarding sources, as this is a largely theoretical body of research, many of the sources utilised will 
be academic, and thus secondary sources. However in the case study, the discourses surrounding the 
intervention, from relevant political actors, is analysed in assessing the justifications for extending 
the intervention to regime change, crucial in answering the research question. Conflating academic 
research with these political discourses strengthens the argument.
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Background 
Following the Cold War, instances of humanitarian intervention have increasingly occurred. 
Humanitarian intervention is the external application of force for clear humanitarian purposes 
(Weiss, 2012: 6). This form of intervention is commonly legitimised and executed by multilateral 
institutions, evidenced by UN authorisation in Somalia and Libya, or through actions taken by 
regional organisations, such as NATO's intervention in Kosovo (Wheeler, 2000: 8). Commonly 
accepted examples of humanitarian interventions include the no-fly zone in Iraq 1991, Somalia 
1993, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999, East Timor 1999 (Pattison, 2010: 1), and both Ivory 
Coast and Libya in 2011 (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 825). 
Discussion of humanitarian intervention reached prominence in 2005, where the UN General 
Assembly established the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) principle, which legitimised military 
intervention through the Security Council in response to serious crimes such as genocide and war 
crimes (Bellamy, 2008: 615). This was based on a 2001 report by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was an attempt to address controversies 
surrounding intervention following Kosovo. The international community is asserted to have a 
responsibility, “to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures” 
(ICISS, 2001; xi). The report sought to “establish clear rules, procedures and criteria of 
humanitarian intervention, especially those related to the decision to intervene, its timing and its 
modalities” (Acharya, 2002: 373). 
The R2P document includes operational guidelines (akin to Jus-in-Bello principles), planning 
considerations and authorities which can legitimise intervention, such as the UN Security Council 
(ICISS, 2001: xii). Additionally, R2P includes the 'Responsibility to Rebuild' (R2R), the 
responsibility of an intervener to provide “full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and 
reconciliation” (ICISS, 2001: xi).
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Chapter One: 
Literature Review 
In addressing the research question, it is prudent to begin by assessing how regime change is 
perceived by the dominant discourses of humanitarian intervention. In doing so, perspectives on 
regime change will be demonstrated in both the advocative 'schools' (Solidarist and Liberal) of 
humanitarian intervention, as well as critical theoretical approaches (Pluralist/Realist and Critical 
perspectives). By identifying dominant discourses and thematic areas within these theoretical 
perspectives in which regime change is addressed, analysis can identify theoretical positions which 
can justify regime change in humanitarian intervention. In doing so, this chapter directly addresses 
the research question and provides a firm base for empirical analysis of the case studies.
Analysis focuses on two areas, first the advocative literature, identifying principles which may 
determine whether regime change is justified, or not, in humanitarian intervention. Critical 
theoretical perspectives are then analysed, to establish how regime change is present in arguments 
against intervention. The two broad perspectives will provide a framework to assess how regime 
change can be justified or unjustified. Firstly, the chapter presents the 'problem' of regime change 
raised by Rieff, and it's contentious history in discussions of humanitarian intervention. 
Problem Definition
Whilst the primary focus of humanitarian intervention is argued to be the cessation of humanitarian 
crisis's, Rieff validly asserts many interventions “have to be about regime change if they are to have 
any chance of accomplishing their stated goal” (2008) In demonstrating his point, Rieff shows, 
“how can the people of Darfur ever be safe as long as the same regime that sanctioned their 
slaughter rules unrepentant in Khartoum?” (2008). These discussions conflate with the long term 
success of an intervention, and R2R responsibilities, as practically, “once atrocities are stopped, 
8
what next?” (Trim, 2011: 392). This logic most clearly applies to cases of 'classic humanitarian 
intervention', where the government is the party committing atrocities (Pattison, 2011a: 251). This 
shows the hypothetical necessity of regime change in cases of unsolicited humanitarian 
intervention.
These assertions raise a dilemma for advocates of intervention, as the, “contentious question of 
‘regime change'” (Trim, 2011: 393) has been “highly controversial” (Ibid) in recent actual and 
'suggested' interventions. Additionally, following the Iraq war, Weiss shows the controversial 
imposition of regime change combined with post-facto humanitarian justifications meant political 
will for intervention in the mid-2000's “evaporated.” (2004: 135). This controversy negatively 
influenced perceptions of the concept of humanitarian intervention, leading to it's 'sunset' (Ibid). 
The “humanitarian veneer” (Weiss, 2004: 149) of the Iraq war is argued by Seybolt to have 
'affirmed' fears among critics that intervention is inevitably tied to intervening state's national 
interests (2007: 4). 
The implications for the growing 'norm' of humanitarian intervention and R2P were significant, 
demonstrated by a number of pessimistic predictions: Gareth Evans argued the crisis left R2P 
“almost choked at birth” (In: Bellamy, 2006: 32); David Clark, former advisor to the UK foreign 
office, stated “Iraq has wrecked our case for humanitarian wars” (In: Bellamy, 2006: 38). This 
debate has been 'persistent' in discussions of humanitarian intervention in the decade since the Iraq 
war (Moses et al, 2011: 349), and indeed, political fallout following the intervention in Libya 
demonstrates this persistence. Rieff argues advocates of the Libyan intervention did not consider the 
implications of enacting regime change in its undertaking, leading to “grave, possibly even 
irreparable, damage to R2P’s prospects of becoming a global norm” (2011). 
The controversy of regime change in Iraq and now Libya clearly have potential ramifications for 
humanitarian intervention and R2P. With this relationship brought into question, it is important to 
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address the distinction Bellamy calls for, between humanitarian intervention and regime changes 
like that in Iraq  (2011: 22). By distinguishing the two concepts, one can identify how regime 
change may be acceptable in the context of humanitarian intervention.
Solidarist and Liberal Internationalist Perspectives
Solidarist and Liberal scholars advocating humanitarian intervention generally argue it is abusive 
states which trigger the criteria necessary to justify humanitarian intervention (i.e. through large 
scale human rights atrocities) (Wheeler, 2000: 309). There are some key themes in the advocative 
literature which reveal perceptions of regime change. These include the judgement of an 
intervention by its outcomes; whether the overthrow of an abusive regime may be 'just cause' for 
intervention; the question of an intervener's motivations and intentions in intervening; and 
discussion regarding the 'means' in achieving an intervention's goals, an argument which directly 
addresses Rieff's point regarding the practical necessity of regime change. The analysis begins with 
whether regime change can be a 'just cause' for intervention. 
Just Cause
In the R2P document, a just cause for intervention is restricted to ending atrocities, be they large-
scale losses of life, or ethnic cleansing (ICISS, 2001: XII). The document stipulates that there “must 
be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur” (Ibid). 
Nardin demonstrates R2P's just cause threshold arguably permits 'pre-emptive' strikes to prevent an 
imminent massacre (2013: 79), however he also demonstrates this argument would not justify war, 
or regime change, but would justify a use of force “short-of-war” to “control a possibly genocidal 
regime without overthrowing it” (Ibid), thus a distinction is made that pre-emptive intervention 
should have more constraints than an intervention ending ongoing atrocities. Such an assertion will 
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later prove relevant with regard to Libya. It can be determined that tyranny alone is not sufficient 
grounds for intervention under R2P.
Such a position reflects dominant discourses in the advocative literature. Brown argues intervention 
is an extreme measure, and not a suitable response to everyday human rights abuses (2003: 35). 
Referring explicitly to whether overthrowing a questionable regime may be justifiable as a 
humanitarian intervention, Nardin shows, “intervention is not permissible in the case of lesser 
crimes, and certainly not to remove illiberal or nondemocratic regimes” (2011: 14). Walzer concurs 
with such a few, showing a regime 'capable' of mass-murder is not cause for intervention  (2006). 
This argument was made in forming a distinction between humanitarian intervention and the Iraq 
War, demonstrating that whilst regimes like Saddam Hussein's were brutal and unpopular, this alone 
cannot warrant intervention (Nardin, 2005: 26).
However, there is disagreement on this question. Teson argues the threshold of ongoing atrocities is 
inadequate; he argues  'severe tyranny' is a more appropriate standard, “which includes not only 
consummated or ongoing atrocities, but also pervasive and serious forms of oppression.” (2005: 
15). The oppression under the Hussein regime and record of atrocities, made the regime change in 
Iraq justifiable for Teson, who states, “The notion that all mass murderers have to do to remain 
safely in power is to stop murdering should be rejected” (Ibid). However, Teson's position is not 
widely shared, with Moses et al categorising him as representing “a minority of the pro-
interventionist community” (2011: 352).
It can be identified that in dominant discourses, the removal of a regime does not represent a just 
cause for intervention, where the focus is on preventing atrocities. However, despite his minority 
position, Teson does saliently add that whilst removing tyranny is not always a sufficient reason for 
war, it certainly “inclines us toward intervention” (2005: 10). The following section analyses 
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perspectives on an intervener's intentions and motives, to assess whether regime change is an 
acceptable goal of intervention, if there is just cause.
Intentions and Motives
Pattison argues that without a humanitarian intention, an intervention cannot be classed as 
humanitarian (2010: 107). Intent is often a central criteria in identifying whether an intervener's 
actions are 'just' or not (Teson 2005, 2).  However, Teson identifies a conceptual issue with 'intent', 
and demonstrates a difference between intent and motive. He identifies an 'intention' as the 
'contemplated act', or what the intervener 'intends' to do in the intervention (2005: 5). In contrast, a 
motive is a “further goal that one wishes to accomplish with the intended act” (Ibid). This definition 
provides a nuance to this discussion, in distinguishing our justification of these two criteria.
The dominant understanding of an acceptable intention is purported in the R2P document, which 
states the primary purpose of any intervention “must be to halt or avert human suffering” (ICISS, 
2011: 51), i.e. to end the atrocities which constituted the 'cause' for intervention. On regime change, 
the document shows it, “ is not, as such, a legitimate objective” (Ibid), as the primary intention 
should be human protection. Indeed, Acharya argues that “outright overthrow” (2002: 375) of 
regimes is clearly not viable under the R2P framework. Regime change would not even be 
justifiable under R2P to remove illegitimate regimes which have overthrown democratic 
governments (e.g. the purpose of the intervention in Haiti 1994) (Amneus, 2012: 243). In parallel to 
perceptions of just causes, this demonstrates a continued focus on addressing humanitarian crises, 
not the removal of local authorities.
It should be noted however, that the deliberate use of the phrase 'as such' reveals a caveat to this 
position. This is a recognition that in fulfilling an intention to protect civilians, it may be necessary 
to 'disable' the target regime's capacity to perpetuate atrocities (ICISS, 2001: 51). Therefore, there 
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may be legitimate justifications for regime change in fulfilling a “humanitarian mandate” (Nardin, 
2011: 15), but this cannot justify an intervention where the primary intention is reforming an 
illiberal state (Ibid). This will be covered further in the section analysing discourses on methods.
Despite this delineation, the attempt by the US and UK government's to justify the Iraq War in 
humanitarian terms created a debate over whether humanitarian intervention and R2P could be used 
to justify the removal of authoritarian regimes, or as Bellamy states, a “Trojan horse” (2006: 32). 
Many advocates stressed the distinctions between the regime change in Iraq and form of 
intervention they are advocating. Iraq's pre-emption and imposed regime change are argued to be 
distinct from the rationale R2P provides for a legitimate intervention (Moses et al, 2011: 360). As 
humanitarian intervention is primarily concerned with ending serious atrocities, Nardin shows Iraq 
“takes us far away from anything recognizable as humanitarian intervention” (In: Ibid).
However, there is again disagreement over justifiable intentions, and indeed the Iraq war. Teson 
argues a justifiable intention includes proving 'forcible help' to “victims of severe tyranny” (2006: 
99). Intervention must therefore be 'aimed' at ending this 'tyranny', of which the Hussein regime 
provided a sufficient rationale (Teson, 2005: 15). In addition to this justification, Feinstein and 
Slaughter proposed a 'Responsibility to Prevent' (in language further blurring the distinction with 
R2P), extending humanitarian arguments to justify coercive force preventing Weapons of Mass 
Destruction proliferation (2004: 137).
These arguments represented a minority of scholars and were particularly unfortunate for those 
attempting to demonstrate a distinction between the concepts. Nardin is particularly critical of 
Teson's justification of the war, describing it as an “ill-defined humanitarianism offered as a 
rationale for revolutionary war and imperial policy” (Nardin 2005: 26). These arguments were 
generally dismissed as counter to R2P principles (Burke, 2005: 76). Holmes is particularly critical, 
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harshly stating the US-UK governments “artfully mobilized disgust at Saddam's sickening atrocities 
to silence liberal critics of an intervention that had patently nonhumanitarian objectives” (2003).
This debate emphasised the dual importance of intentions and motives. Teson made a distinction 
between the US-UK's intentions and motives in Iraq. He argues the intention was to institute a 
liberal democratic regime and promote human rights, which creates positive humanitarian 
outcomes, regardless of their wider motivations for invading (2005: 10). The question of motives is 
heavily discussed, Bellamy demonstrates many scholars believe an intervention may only be 
legitimate if it is guided by humanitarian motivations/concerns, in addition to a primary 
humanitarian intention/purpose (2004: 223). Not all advocative scholars believe this is necessary 
and R2P recognises mixed motives are a 'fact of life' in international relations (ICISS, 2001: 36). 
Dominant perspectives do however agree the motive should be at least part humanitarian.
In cases where the motivation is humanitarian, at least in part, with an intention to halt atrocities, 
regime change will be more palatable and justifiable, as it can be legitimately justified in the 
aforementioned fulfilment of a humanitarian mandate. In contrast, Iraq demonstrates that if regime 
change represents an 'intervener's' non-humanitarian motives, it undermines the legitimacy of the 
entire intervention (Bellamy, 2006: 31). It should be noted, that despite the deleterious ramifications 
for humanitarian intervention following Iraq, it is argued the crisis served the effect of reinforcing 
the 'boundaries' of R2P and “shed light on the confusion between the emerging norm and the 
doctrines of pre-emptive use of force” (Badescu & Weiss, 2010: 362). It reinforced the view that 
humanitarian intervention is only justified in addressing humanitarian crises, not to impose political 
systems (Falk, 2008: 11). 
To summarise, in addition to being unjustifiable as a 'just cause', dominant discourses demonstrate 
regime change is unjustifiable as an intervention's intention, though there are caveats to this position 
which will be addressed. A non-humanitarian motive to pursue regime change would also 
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undermine the legitimacy of an intervention. Analysis now turns to assertions that an intervention 
should be judged on it's humanitarian outcomes, not 'principles' like intentions and motives.
Outcomes
In advocative literature, scholars often apply what Bellamy describes as an 'outcomes orientated' 
approach, whereby interventions are judged by their humanitarian outcomes, opposed to criteria 
such as an intervener's motives/interests (2004: 224). These criteria remain important, but are not 
the most important variable in judging an intervention (Ibid). Wheeler (2000) is a notable advocate 
of this position. This perspective judges an intervention by its effectiveness in ending the 
humanitarian crisis/atrocities (Wheeler, 2000: 38). This perspective provides a frame for analysis, as 
these discourses may regard regime change as contributing to a positive outcome of an intervention.
This outcomes-based approach is demonstrated in discussions of the Cold War-era interventions of 
India-East Pakistan/Bangladesh, Vietnam-Cambodia and Tanzania-Uganda, all of which saw the 
target state's regime overthrown. Wheeler asserts in all of these cases the use of military force was 
“justifiable because the use of force was the only means of ending atrocities on a massive scale” 
(2000: 295). In all three cases, military action was illegal and absent of humanitarian motives, but 
the humanitarian outcomes are judged to justify these actions (Wheeler, 2000: 294). Walzer argues 
the interventions would have never been authorised by the UN, yet they were 'just' in ending 
atrocities (2012: 41), the Tanzanian intervention also received informal and popular support, as it 
“removed a barbarous regime at relatively modest cost” (Donnelly, 2003: 255).
On the question of legality, Wheeler shows that although these examples were illegal according to 
the UN charter, he argues “this legal stipulation ignores the political reality that ending crimes 
against humanity on the scale of the Bangladeshi and Cambodian cases requires such drastic 
actions” (2000: 75). Furthermore, the intervention in Kosovo was not approved by the Security 
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Council, but was widely regarded as illegal, but legitimate, as it resolved a humanitarian crisis 
(Chandler, 2006: 139). The primacy of humanitarian considerations over legality or ethical 
'principles' could justify regime change. However, intervention is more justifiable when authorised 
by the Security Council, due to the commensurate legitimation and legality (Weiss, 2012: 117), but 
in this context, regime change remains contentious and unlikely to be explicitly endorsed by the 
Security Council.
Indeed, regime change may be regarded as a positive outcome, as Walzer asserts that intervention 
“radically shifts the argument about endings” (2004: 19) as the intervention needs from the 
beginning to be “an effort to change the regime that is responsible for the inhumanity” (Ibid). Such 
assertions will be expanded upon in discussions of methods and post-conflict rebuilding.
Analysis of perspectives on outcomes demonstrate that regime change may form a component of an 
intervention's positive humanitarian outcome, which in addition to demonstrating its potential 
necessity, could be justified even if the intervention is illegal and the motives for intervening mixed. 
It is appropriate to now analyse the question of regime change's practical necessity in an 
interventions undertaking, with regime change a practical outcome in resolving atrocities. 
Means
There is an assertion with methods, that the core concern is whether they can effectively achieve the 
aims of the intervention (i.e. ending the atrocities) (Bellamy, 2004: 223). In judging the 
appropriateness of methods, many scholars apply what Weiss calls 'situational ethics' (2012: 91), in 
contrast to unrealistically dogmatic principles. In the pursuance of such criteria, solidarist/liberal 
scholars may justify regime change as a necessity or by-product, despite it being already 
demonstrated that regime change is not an acceptable cause or primary intention. 
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In general, discussion of methods in humanitarian intervention focus on the 'proportionality' of 
military force, in addition to the aforementioned achievement intervention's humanitarian aims. 
Proportionality principles are detailed in the R2P document, in a framework described by Acharya 
as a “minimalism in terms of the scale, intensity and duration of military action” (2002: 375). 
However, the pursuit of a humanitarian objective also requires the intervention is robust enough to 
be 'successful', and Wheeler agrees with Teson that a positive humanitarian outcome is judged by 
“whether the intervention has rescued the victims of oppression, and whether human rights have 
subsequently been restored” (In: Wheeler, 2000: 37). The 'rescue' refers to the immediate aim of the 
intervention, the second to the long-term prevention of atrocities, to be discussed shortly.
In fulfilling a humanitarian objective, scholarly discourses demonstrate consideration of Rieff's 
thesis regarding the potential necessity of regime change. By intervening in cases where 
government's are the party committing atrocities, regime change can be justified in achieving the 
long term end of atrocities. Whilst dominant perspectives and R2P do not view the removal of a 
regime as just cause or primary intention, it does show that 'disabling' them “may be essential to 
discharging the mandate of protection” (ICISS, 2001: 51). Seybolt also demonstrates that in the 
context of mass atrocities, it may be necessary to militarily 'defeat' the perpetrators (2007: 222). In 
such circumstances, interveners will need to alter the political order of the target state, by either: 
“driving the power holders from power, forcing them permanently to cede control over a piece of 
territory or forcing them to accept a power-sharing arrangement with the group they are oppressing” 
(Seybolt, 2007: 225). All options constitute some form of regime change and some scholars would 
justify outright regime change in this context. 
Such justifications are distinct from intent, or just cause, as Nardin belies Walzer in arguing a 
government cannot be overthrown unless doing so is necessary to suppress the crimes (Nardin, 
2013: 78). This position distinguishes these justifications from intentions or causes of intervention. 
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On this distinction, Nardin shows an intervention to impose democracy cannot be justified as 
humanitarian, “but an intervention to thwart mass murder cannot avoid calling for a new regime that 
respects human rights” (2013: 79). Walzer similarly states regime change follows from the purpose 
of human protection, and a government committing atrocities against it's people displays an 
'aggressiveness' and 'murderousness' which “makes a political regime a legitimate candidate for 
forcible transformation” (2006). The logic of replacing the regime to ensure a long term end to the 
atrocities which justified intervention becomes linked with discussions of post-conflict 
responsibilities, a core component of R2P, to be addressed in the next section.
However, some advocates of intervention view regime change with more caution, even in the 
circumstances demonstrated above. Pape argues the success of an intervention should not be 
dependant upon the replacement of the target regime, he states “the threatened population may 
subsequently seek to overthrow the government, [but] the success of the international mission does 
not hinge on foreign-imposed regime change” (2012: 56). Stewart similarly argues an intervention 
should focus on human protection, and avoid  'risky' and maximalist goals (2012: 78). It is argued 
regime change may create a power vacuum, leading to a complicated and unpredictable 'quagmire' 
for an intervener and may subsequently blur the distinction between 'liberator' and 'occupier' (Ibid). 
One could add that regime change may also cause significant criticism internationally. 
It is clear that regime change can be justified as a practical necessity in fulfilling a humanitarian 
mandate, in ending atrocities and preventing their recurrence, particularly in situations where the 
government is committing atrocities, which is of relevance to the Libyan case study. However, it is 
also clear that whilst theoretically justifiable, a level of caution is also advised. With reference to the 
long term prevention of atrocities, this discussion leads to analysis of post-conflict responsibilities. 
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'Responsibility to Rebuild'
Following from a discussion of methods during intervention, is that of post-conflict responsibilities. 
The R2P document identifies a 'responsibility to rebuild', which stipulates an intervener should 
assist in post-conflict reconstruction, to address the “causes of the harm” the intervention was 
intended to end (ICISS, 2001: XI). It should however be noted, that this 'responsibility' was not 
officially endorsed by the UN's 2005 World Outcome document, which endorsed various aspects of 
R2P (Amneus, 2012: 246).
This responsibility is rooted in two primary assertions. Firstly, by intervening an actor takes on 
responsibilities after the conflict's conclusion, whereby it's success is determinant on restoring order 
and stability (Bass, 2004: 386). Walzer shows particularly in the context of regime change, the 
intervener takes a “degree of responsibility for the creation of an alternative government” (2006b: 
104). Even in Iraq, the coalition is argued, in spite of questionable motives, to have taken on 
“certain responsibilities to the Iraqi people” (Bellamy, 2008b: 620). These assertions are crucial as 
Bass shows “a failure to commit to reconstruction is indicative of an absence of genuine 
humanitarian intent behind the original intervention” (In: Bellamy, 2008b: 615). Fulfilling R2R 
responsibilities are important in justifying an intervention which removes an existing regime. 
The second element of this responsibility, is the prevention of atrocities from recurring in the future, 
conflating with previous discussion on regime change's 'necessity'. Wheeler shows a primary test is 
ensuring the withdrawal of intervening forces does not lead to a resumption of killing, requiring the 
intervener to establish a political order “hospitable to the protection of human rights” (2000: 37). He 
argues an intervention draws upon long and short-term aims: firstly ending the  'humanitarian 
emergency'; secondly, the long term need to address the underlying causes of the atrocities (Ibid). 
Therefore, an ethically justifiable intervention must ensure a conflict will not resurge, otherwise the 
original intervention will be in question (Bass, 2004: 412).
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Indeed, this latter responsibility may be an understated justification for regime change, stipulated by 
R2P. In situations where the government is responsible for the humanitarian crisis, the intervention 
must early on view regime change as necessary to ensure long term success in ending atrocities. 
Indeed, Nardin shows these considerations are crucial in informing perspectives on when regime 
change is necessary, to prevent victims from being future suffering if a regime maintains power 
(Nardin, 2013: 75). Bellamy shows that even minimalist perspectives on post conflict 
responsibilities, “permits the removal of a government and transformation of a state and society in 
cases where the nature of the state and/or society themselves gave just cause for war” (2008b: 617). 
This responsibility is a clear justification of regime change, and parallels Rieff's thesis. 
On post-conflict rebuilding responsibilities, Bellamy identifies two 'schools' of thought, 'maximalist' 
and 'minimalist' perspectives. In maximalist perspectives, Bellamy shows that there is a belief that 
following an intervention the intervener must fulfil certain responsibilities for the intervention to be 
'just' (2008b: 602). The intervener is argued to be responsible for governing, “until the conditions 
for self-determination have been established” (Nardin, 2013: 76). Long term measures may 
necessitate 'nation-building' and sovereign responsibility over the target state, demonstrated by the 
UN's assumption of 'sovereign responsibility' in four territories in the late 1990's, (Bosnia, Kosovo, 
East Timor and Eastern Slavonia) where it had considerable authority (Bellamy, 2009: 170). Nardin 
demonstrates long term commitments of 'trusteeships' and 'protectorates' may be necessary 
following regime change (2013: 78). 
However, these measures are somewhat controversial, as critics argue humanitarian intervention 
may become a loose justification for altering states in the pursuit of an intervener's self-interests 
(Bellamy, 2008b: 621). R2P advises interveners to avoid actions akin to “neocolonialism” (ICISS, 
2001: 45), but Pape shows the R2R responsibilities make the problem 'intractable', and extensive 
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rebuilding responsibilities may make humanitarian intervention 'indistinguishable' from “foreign 
imposed regime change” (2012: 52).
Minimalists believe post-conflict responsibilities should be limited. Minimalists argue there should 
not be long-term obligations that “interventions are always followed by multi-annual nation-
building measures” (Knaus, 2012: 191). India's invasion of East Pakistan is put forward as a 
minimalist example, as India imposed no control following the intervention, as Bangladesh was a 
“strong and unified people” (2013: 76) and able to rebuild without foreign supervision. Indeed, 
Bellamy argues that if an intervener has successfully ended mass atrocities, their actions may be 
“regarded as legitimate irrespective of the aggressor’s commitment to maximalist jus post bellum” 
(2008b: 621). This is part practical necessity, as not all states have capacity to undertake extensive 
rebuilding measures. However, Nardin saliently reminds us that some circumstances may require a 
level of post-conflict reconstruction to ensure a positive humanitarian outcome (2013: 76).
R2R obligations therefore provide both a justification for regime change, as a requirement to stop 
the recurrence of the humanitarian crisis, and also further criteria for judging such an action, as if 
fulfilling a humanitarian mandate may dictate a commitment to rebuilding the target state.
Summary
To summarise discourses from the advocative literature, there are clear nuances in discussion of 
regime change. The R2P document and dominant perspectives show an abusive regime alone cannot 
be a justifiable 'cause' for intervention, nor can regime change be an intention per say. However, in 
what Chandler describes as significant caveats (2004: 70), regime change can be legitimate, as both 
a means to achieving a humanitarian objective, and a positive outcome of an intervention. Indeed, 
with regard to methods, including long-term rebuilding responsibilities, regime change is justified 
in certain contexts, particularly those where the government is committing the atrocities triggering 
21
intervention. The need to end atrocities, and prevent their recurrence may also make regime change 
necessary in fulfilling the aims of an intervention. These positions provide a basis for analysis of the 
case studies, in identifying the extent to which they may be justified by the advocative literature. 
More critical perspectives on humanitarian intervention will now be assessed, as analysing the 
arguments against intervention, and regime change in this context, can ascertain conditions and 
factors which may de-legitimise such action. 
Pluralist/Realist and Critical Perspectives 
Sceptical theoretical perspectives produce a more straightforward critique of regime change in 
instances of humanitarian intervention, being averse to the concept in general. Whilst some critics 
recognise the moral strength of the concept, or potential utility in extreme case like genocide, it is 
generally unacceptable (Bellamy, 2004: 19). A principle common to most critical perspectives is 
that whilst civilian protection may be legitimate in particular context, “it must not become 
synonymous with regime change” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 846). The various arguments against 
intervention are not mutually exclusive to theoretical schools, although “different theories afford 
different weight to each of the objections” (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2008: 526). The analysis begins 
with the legal critique of intervention, which addresses and warns against regime change.
Legality and Sovereignty
A common criticism is that intervention is illegal under international law. 'Restrictionist' legal 
perspectives, argue that aside from self-defence, there are no other exceptions to the UN Charter's 
restriction of force unless authorised by the Security Council (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2008: 527). 
Underlying these arguments is respect for state-sovereignty, including non-intervention as the the 
foundation of international order (Ayoob, 2010: 81). Critics therefore identify the dangers of any 
'license' of intervention legitimising regime change, which is a “primary concern for contemporary 
22
opponents of legalizing humanitarian intervention” (Goodman, 2006: 119). Regime change puts 
particular emphasis on arguments against intervention's legality. 
A further legal criticism focuses on ethically-based legitimisation of previous interventions, such as 
1999 Kosovo, where judgements of 'illegal, but legitimate' are criticised as setting a dangerous 
precedent (Chandler, 2006: 139). Following its adoption by the UN in 2005, it has been suggested 
that R2P “‘legalizes’ or ‘legitimises’ non-consensual intervention potentially without the sanction of 
the UN Security Council” (Bellamy, 2008: 616). Critics identify the dangers of ethically-based 
justifications, as Chandler shows they both undermine sovereignty, and “usher in a more coercive, 
Western dominated, international order” (2004: 87). He therefore argues there is no 'right' of 
intervention, especially not a 'right' of 'regime change' akin to Iraq, despite advocates 'ethical' 
arguments (2006: 251). This demonstrates only interventions sanctioned by the Security Council 
can be legitimate, purporting the importance of international law, despite 'ethical' arguments. 
These critics do not solely focus on intervention un-authorised by the Security Council, as it is 
argued interveners have previously relied upon 'implied authorisation' of UNSC resolutions, 
whereby a limited mandate may be stretched to justify unauthorised action (Bellamy & Wheeler, 
2008: 527). This argument has become particularly elevated following Libya, where interpretation 
of Security Council Resolution 1973 was particularly controversial (Rieff, 2011). This will thus be a 
focus of analysis in the case study.
The issues of legality and 'un-authorised' regime change are of particular relevance in justifying 
intervention, as shadows of illegality will provide cause for criticism. As unauthorised actions are 
often argued to demonstrate an intervener's interests, interests are the next focus of analysis.
Self-Interest and Non-Humanitarian Motives
The influence of intervener's self-interests are purported as a prominent issue, though in different 
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veins. Pluralist/realists argue intervention is imprudent, as they do not serve an intervener's national 
interests (Jackson, 1993: 603). As a result, these critics assert that intervention to 'save strangers' is 
unjustifiable in either resources or soldiers lives, as without sufficient national interests to justify 
action, “human and material costs easily can be seen as unaffordably high by domestic constituents” 
(1995: 71). Therefore regime change, which likely requires sustained military efforts and the 
aforementioned post-conflict responsibilities, is unlikely to be justifiable. 
Furthermore, states acting out of altruism are likely to only commit to 'half-hearted' measures, likely 
to leave the situation worse off and political situation more intractable (Ayoob, 1995: 71). Somalia 
is commonly cited, where the US intervention lacked the political will to be effective, a fact 
exposed following a disastrous attempt to remove local authorities in Warlord Aidid (arguably an 
attempt for regime change) (Wheeler, 2000: 204). Ayoob critically shows advocates of intervention 
may accordingly link ethical concerns with national interests, which he argues only makes 
intervention more 'suspect', as it provides cover for the sole pursuit of national interests (2002: 86). 
This position identifies intervention as imprudent, and regime change (with its commensurate high 
costs and long-term obligations) unjustifiable and unsustainable. 
In contrast, critical scholars argue that through intervention, states seek to advance their national 
interests, using humanitarian justifications as a 'tool' to this end (Chandler, 2000: 60). Should self-
interests influence the decision to undertake an intervention, critics argue it is “tainted” (Szende, 
2012: 69). These 'purists' argue only solely humanitarian motives are legitimate (Ibid). However, 
Ayoob shows the decision to intervene is often “blatantly politically motivated” (1995: 70) and 
dictated by economic and strategic considerations, even if they are “justified with reference to 
[humanitarian] ideals” (Ayoob, 2002: 86). The purported action in the name of 'international will' 
being a “fig leaf” (Ayoob, 2002: 88) to hide interest-based interests. To critics, Iraq was the epitome 
of these concerns, demonstrating the malleability of 'humanitarianism', as a “cloak of convenience 
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for an ill-conceived US foreign policy adventure” (Moses et al, 2011: 350). As a result, an 
intervention which imposes regime change would be viewed with suspicion, as it may reflect the 
primary motive for intervening.  
It is argued the selectivity of intervention demonstrates underlying interests, as intervention often 
takes place when equally deserving humanitarian crisis's are ignored (Szende, 2012: 63). For 
example, NATO intervened in Kosovo, but ignored far worse humanitarian situations in Rwanda 
and Darfur (Brown, 2003: 32). As those situations 'requiring' intervention are usually determined by 
the West alone (Ayoob, 1995: 71), these concerns are “ultimately a worry about sinister reasons 
operating under the cover of humanitarian reasons” (Szende, 2012: 71). Whilst generally accepted 
that motives for intervention are never solely humanitarian, the presence of interests, and selectively 
applied intervention reinforce fears that R2P and intervention are a 'trojan horse'.
These positions inform the next debate, which argues R2P and humanitarian intervention are open 
to abuse, providing moral/ethical justification for the pursuit of patently non-ethical interests. 
A 'Blank Slate' 
Fears that R2P and intervention are open to abuse are the reason the influence of self-interest is of 
such concern. Moses et al illustrate the concern that states may ‘abuse’, ‘manipulate’, or 
‘misappropriate’ the moral justifications of R2P (2011: 349). It is indeed argued that in a post-Cold 
War framework with little check on Western action, R2P is an “easily abused framework” (Hehir, 
2010: 223), and facilitates, not restricts, powerful state's actions, removing weaker state's 
“sovereign immunity” (Moses, 2013: 134). The unspecific threshold justifying intervention in R2P, 
and allowance of 'pre-empted' human protection, leads Pape to argue it 'sets the bar' too low, giving 
intervener's freedom to choose 'suitable' situations for coercive action (2012: 12). Therefore, many 
third-world governments (particularly the Non-Aligned Movement), view R2P with suspicion, as a 
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'sophisticated' way of legitimising intervention (Bellamy, 2008: 616). This abusable framework has 
the potential to loosely justify regime change under the auspices of humanitarianism and R2P.
These arguments naturally parallel accusations of imperialism, particularly intervention followed by 
the imposition of liberal ideology. Indeed, the inherent standard of governance dictated by 
'sovereignty as responsibility' revokes the 'standards of civilisation', dictating 'civilised' and 
'uncivilised' regions (Ayoob, 2002: 85). The appeal to the illegitimacy of third world governments 
“raises the spectre of a return to colonial habits and practises on the part of major Western powers” 
(Ibid). Parekh argues intervener’s ideology influences their actions, with inevitable “external 
imposition” (1997: 56), emphasising Pape's concern that R2R carries inevitable questions of 
neocolonialism (2012: 52). 
Many scholars therefore frustratedly argue the USA and West should not be viewed as benign or 
benevolent powers. Holmes stingingly argues that by elevating humanitarianism and ethical politics 
to justify any government action, advocates have “implicitly licensed” the US and its allies to 
pursue whatever action they wish, providing “a new legitimacy for the exercise of US power” 
(Chandler. 2004: 71). Such 'licence' also carries unexpected implications, demonstrated by the 
Russian government's justification for invading Georgia in 2008 as a “human protection exercise” 
(2013: 134). This argument demonstrates R2P may be a malleable framework, and advocates should 
not automatically assume action with a humanitarian outcome is necessarily justified or benevolent. 
Summary
The various critiques of intervention stipulate clear issues to be addressed in cases of regime 
change. The pervasive issue of state interests, combined with an abusable 'ethical' framework would 
require a just intervention to disprove charges of non-humanitarian motivations, particularly as 
pluralists/realists demonstrate states rarely act from pure altruism. These charges will have to be 
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addressed for regime change in an intervention to be ethically justified. Legal stipulations for 
intervention and regime change to be authorised by the UN Security Council are also important. 
Additional criticism of 'loose interpretations' of Security Council resolutions to impose regime 
change is relevant to the Libya case study. 
Conclusion
This chapter identifies thematic discourses in the theoretical literature which provide criteria for 
judging whether regime change can be justified in humanitarian intervention. Rieff's assertion that 
regime change has not been aptly considered by advocates of humanitarian intervention is 
somewhat justified, as it remains fleetingly addressed by 'abstract' theory.
In the advocative literature, regime change is seemingly legitimated only as a 'caveat' or 'exception' 
in non-specific situations, where it 'may' be necessary. Situations where these caveats may apply 
(i.e. in protecting civilians from regime-committed atrocities) can be distinguished from more 
unsuitable circumstances (i.e. where there is no humanitarian crisis). The question of means and 
R2R are important in addressing Rieff's argument regarding regime change's practical necessity. 
These discourses show a 'classic humanitarian intervention' to end government atrocities would 
surely need to alter the political order, necessitating regime change. As Libya is such a case, this is 
highly relevant. 
The critical perspectives on intervention assert that self-interested action is common, showing 
however seemingly justifiable instances of regime change may be, practically and theoretically, it 
will inevitably be the subject of criticism. The accusations that R2P and humanitarian intervention 
are open to abuse, ensure such outcomes will come under severe scrutiny. 
This evidence provides a form basis in addressing the research question, as it identifies criteria 
which can justify or illegitimate regime change in cases of humanitarian intervention. These criteria 
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can now be applied to the case study, to determine whether these theoretical justifications have 
practical applicability. The identified criteria can be used to judge whether the justifications for 
regime change in Libya would be legitimised by theoretical perspectives and consistent with R2P.
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Libya: 'Between Two Stools'
On the 17th March 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authorising a no-fly zone 
and 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians in Libya. This was the first unambiguous case of 
humanitarian intervention since the adoption of R2P, and the first case of 'classic' humanitarian 
intervention for over a decade (Pattison, 2011: 251). The events which followed have led to severe 
debate over the alleged pursuance of regime change by the  interveners. Following both military 
success of the intervention some commentators have viewed the intervention as buoying the R2P 
norm, putting “new wind in the sails of humanitarian intervention” (Patrick, 2011b). However, 
critics show the political fallout of enacting regime change has caused potentially irreparable 
damage to R2P (Rieff, 2011).
This chapter addresses this debate. By assessing perceptions of the regime change in Libya using 
evidence gathered in the last chapter to ascertain whether the intervention can be justified in the 
literature and R2P.
Chronology of Events
Pre-Intervention
Preceding the Libyan intervention were a series of nationwide protests beginning in January and 
February 2011, which were met with immediate violent repression by the Gadaffi regime (Graubart, 
2013: 70). As these demonstrations grew it was reported that Gadaffi forces were utilising brutal 
military force against protesters (Pape, 2012: 63). Several hundred people had been killed in late 
February, a number revised to 2,000 in 'knowledgeable estimates' (Ibid). On the 26th February the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 1970, which condemned Gadaffi's actions; referred Libya 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC); approved sanctions and an arms embargo, but stopped 
short of authorising military action (Ibid). Gadaffi's actions were condemned and Western 
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governments called for him to step down (BBC News, 2011; The Huffington Post, 2011).  
An impending crisis in Benghazi was the driver in creating an impetus for intervention. When 
Gadaffi's forces approached the rebel-held city, his words suggested atrocities were imminent, 
declaring to 'show no mercy' to the protesters, whom were described as 'rats' and 'cockroaches', 
chillingly echoing language of the Rwandan genocide (Pape, 2012: 63). This provoked fears of an 
impending massacre. Regional groups LAS and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called for the 
UN to intervene and, “‘take all necessary measures to protect civilians” (Bellamy & Williams, 
2011: 840). The Obama administration declared that as many as 100,000 civilians may die without 
intervention, either directly or through the subsequent humanitarian crisis (Pape, 2012: 64).
The Security Council subsequently passed Resolution 1973, authorising a no-fly zone and 'all 
necessary measures' to protect civilians (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 845). The Obama 
administration immediately began distancing the forthcoming intervention from any goal of regime 
change (Pape, 2012: 68). 
During Intervention
Following the resolution's approval, the immediate goal of protecting Benghazi was achieved 
(Economist, 2011). However, differences emerged as to how 'all necessary measures'  in Resolution 
1973 should be interpreted (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 845). Sceptical states like Russia and China 
warned acting beyond the mandate of the resolution would be “unacceptable” (Ibid). 
Commentators questioned what the ultimate goal of the intervention was and whether the resolution 
authorised regime change (Massie, 2011). The rhetorical calls for Gadaffi to step down were 
compared to the limited UN mandate. Obama made clear the resolution was not for on regime 
change, and intervention would not go beyond “a well-defined goal, specifically the protection of 
civilians in Libya” (Tapper et al., 2011). However, questions regarding the long term practicality of 
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regime change were raised, in Prime Ministers Questions, James Arbuthnot MP asked “while 
regime change is not the aim of these resolutions, in practice there is little realistic chance of 
achieving their aims without regime change?” (House of Commons, 2011). Prime Minister 
Cameron responded that the aim of the intervention was strictly human protection, but he also stated 
that Gadaffi does has to leave power as, “It is almost impossible to envisage a future for Libya that 
includes him” (Ibid). Such an answer identifies an early problem of differing political and military 
goals. 
The conflict continued, and the crisis had morphed into civil war (Economist, 2011). On April 14th 
Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy published a widely discussed op-ed piece in several newspapers, 
stating their intention to continue military operations “so long as Qaddafi is in power” (Obama et 
al., 2011). The piece reinforced that intervention is to protect civilians, but that it is “unthinkable 
that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their future government” 
(Ibid). The leaders warned of 'fearful vengeance' in the future if Gadaffi stays in power, therefore 
arguing that to fulfil the long-term aims of the mandate, they dedicated to maintain operations until 
he leaves, “so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds” (Ibid). It was 
argued the intervention had now merged into a policy of regime change (Black, 2011). 
The campaign subsequently dragged into stalemate, with little development of a political solution or 
Gadaffi being removed after 4 months (Birnbaum & Londono, 2011). To break this stalemate, it was 
argued the nature of the operation began to shift, with escalating air strikes, deploying attack 
helicopters and US Predator drones (Williams & Popken, 2011: 235). It was perceived the 
intervener's goals were 'dovetailing' with the rebels in attempting to disable Gadaffi's military 
(Lister, 2011). France & Qatar began supplying rebels with arms, despite the embargo (Williams & 
Popken, 2011: 235) and NATO air-strikes began targeting Gadaffi (Joshi, 2011). Tripoli fell in 
August, and two months after the fall of Tripoli, Gadaffi was killed on 20th October after the rebel 
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forces took the town of Sirte, and the intervention ended on October 27th (Gladstone, 2011). 
Post-Intervention 
Following the intervention, Western leaders and advocative commentators lauded the success of the 
intervention (Patrick, 2011b; Daalder & Stavridis, 2011). David Cameron argued the reasons for 
this success were adherence to limited goals, the legality of working through the UN, the support of 
the Libyan people, which allowed the intervention to prevent atrocities in Benghazi and assist “the 
Libyan people to liberate themselves” (Evening Standard, 2011). Obama similarly asserted the 
success in protecting Libyan civilians and “helping them break free from a tyrant” (Bohan, 2011).
Analysis
The intervention in Libya brought the issue of regime change sharply into focus. Many initial 
advocates of the intervention questioned the pursuance of this outcome and critics similarly argued 
regime change was primary motivation for intervening (Evans, 2011: 41; Graubart, 2012: 69). 
Analysis will attempt to determine whether the regime change can be justified by theoretical 
perspectives and R2P, to test whether the theoretical justifications for regime change gathered in the 
previous chapter are practically applicable. 
Several thematic issues will be addressed. A foremost criticism of the intervention was the illegality 
of 'stretching' the UN mandate to enact regime change. There are also doubts there was 'just cause' 
for such an outcome. Whether the intentions of the interveners was really protecting civilians was 
also questioned. The analysis will address these principled criticisms, but then analyse the more 
practical criteria of means and R2R.t. The analysis will begin with analysis of the regime change's 
legality under Resolution 1973.
Legality 
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Whilst this paper is not focussed on legal arguments, the perceived 'stretching' and 'breaking' of 
Resolution 1973 was a forceful criticism of the intervention. This issue was a key reason for the 
diplomatic fallout following the intervention (Johnson & Mueen, 2012: 3; Ulfstein & Christiansen, 
2013). This section will analyse the assertion that regime change could not be enacted under 
Resolution 1973, and how this influences the interventions justifiability.
It is pertinent to first establish the content of Resolution 1973, which authorised: the no-fly zone, 
and 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians and 'civilian populated areas' from 'threat of attack', 
excluding a foreign occupation force; demanded an end to hostilities; maintained an arms embargo 
(a later point of controversy); imposed measures against the regime including asset freezes and 
travel bans (UN Security Council, 2011).
No Authorisation for Regime Change
The basis for legal criticism was that the resolution only authorised civilian protection, with no 
basis for pursuing a political goal of regime change (Thakur, 2011: 3). Therefore NATO was widely 
criticized for “what some states see as an overly expansive interpretation of Resolution 1973” 
(Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 846). When this end-goal supposedly became obvious, there was 
widespread criticism of the interveners, South Africa's UN Ambassador stating the resolution 
authorised only the no-fly zone, not “regime change or anything else” (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 
2013: 167). These criticisms were a response to the way NATO aggressively enforced the mandate, 
which amounted to disabling Gadaffi's military capability, which had no explicit basis in the 
resolution (Ibid).
The intervening forces interpreted 'all necessary measures' broadly. Whilst the resolution provided 
no elaboration on the extent of  'all necessary measures', it was argued it did not permit targeting of 
Gadaffi's forces who posed no immediate risk to civilians, including 'command and control centres' 
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which were targeted to reduce Gadaffi's ability to coordinate his forces (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 
2013: 169). The Russian foreign minister stated “we see actions that in a number of cases go 
beyond the framework drawn by the UN Security Council” (Russia Today, 2011). The 'legal litmus 
test' is whether these measures were aimed for the purpose of human protection (Ulfstein & 
Christiansen, 2013: 167). Critics believed these measures were not indicative of human protection, 
but an intention of regime change (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013: 169). 
There were several other distinct criticisms. It was charged that the intervener's actions amounted to 
intervening on the rebels side in a civil war which could not be justified by the resolution, and did 
not amount to protecting civilians (Thakur, 2011: 3). Support and collusion with the rebels became 
increasingly clear, providing direct air support and pursuing aims which “dovetailed with those of 
the rebels -- with the aim of making pro-Gaddafi forces incapable of offensive action” (Zenko in: 
Lister, 2011). This was problematic, as the resolution did not permit military support for the rebels 
(Payandeh, 2012: 381). Rebel consent could not legitimate such action, as though many intervening 
states had recognised the rebel's National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of 
Libya, an 'intervention by invitation’ cannot apply in civil wars (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013:169).
A second distinct issue was arming the rebels. Critics argue Resolution 1970 had imposed arms ban 
to all areas and parties within Libya, thus arming the rebels was a violation (Ulfstein & 
Christiansen, 2013: 168). However, advocates note Resolution 1973 authorised “all necessary 
measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 [which implements the arms embargo]” 
(Trevelyan, 2011) to protect civilians. This amendment was argued by the UK and USA to provide a 
legal basis for arming the rebels, if it could be framed as protecting civilians under threat of attack 
(Ibid). However, this stipulation was not widely accepted, and the legal technicality further 
antagonised sceptical states in the Security Council, adding to the notion that the primary intention 
was regime change (Ibid).
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A 'Loose Justification'
However, some advocates argue a broad mandate – encompassing regime change – was legitimised 
in Resolution 1973 (Williams & Popken, 2011: 233). The phrase 'all necessary measures' blurred the 
line between 'lawful' disabling of the regime's capacity to harm civilians, and general conflict with 
Gadaffi's forces (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013: 167). For example, the targeted command and 
control centres arguably enhanced Gadaffi’s capabilities to attack his own people (Ulfstein & 
Christiansen, 2013: 167). The wide provision of 'all necessary measures' meant the argument could 
be made that whilst regime change  not an appropriate goal, it was a legitimate means in pursuing 
the mandate of protecting civilians (Payandeh, 2012: 388).  
Indeed, Ban Ki-Moon argued following the intervention that the mandate of the resolution was 
strictly enforced (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013: 167). Furthermore, it can be argued the resolution 
did take sides, and recognised the “democratic dimension of the conflict” (Payandeh, 2012: 387), as 
it dictated any solution to the crisis must “respond to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people” 
(Ibid). These demands clearly couldn't be achieved with Gadaffi still in power and nor would 
civilians couldn't be safe until he was removed (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013: 167). Welsh indeed 
views the resolution itself is a move away from the UN's traditional impartiality, not just its 
execution, in recognising Gadaffi as a 'wrong-doer' (Welsh, 2011: 5). 
However, despite these arguments, they are generally considered insufficient in legitimising 
Gadaffi's overthrow. Most importantly, stretching the mandate to justify the interveners to directly 
enact regime change cannot be justified by the Resolution (Payandeh, 2012: 388). Despite the 
blurred line between conflict and protection, direct air support for Libyan rebels clearly went 
beyond the mandate (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013: 169). However, as the resolution did not 
provide a clear military solution, merely an end to the violence (Chatham House, 2011: 2), it was 
asserted that whilst not a legally justifiable, regime change could arguably be legitimate as a means 
38
in fulfilling the mandate. This was to be the foremost argument of the interveners, thus whilst not 
legal, the intervention may be justifiable under R2P and the academic literature. 
Just Cause
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, tyranny alone is not regarded as legitimate cause for 
intervention under the R2P doctrine. The human rights abuses in Libya committed from February-
March, and 'imminent' atrocities in Benghazi were the cause for intervention in Libya (Pattison, 
2011b: 2). Just cause in Libya is subject of debate, as it raises the contentious issue of preventing 
'imminent' abuses, and thus counter-factual evidence. It is crucially asserted that there may have 
been just cause for intervening, but not just cause for regime change, which requires addressal. 
An Initial Just Cause?
As demonstrated, to meet R2P's standards, there must be on-going atrocities, or such atrocities 
“imminently likely to occur” (ICISS, 2001: XII). In Libya, these standards are argued to be met, as 
whilst R2P stipulates no 'threshold' (number of casualties), Gadaffi's actions provided 'ample 
justification' due to the indiscriminate force and massacres inflicted by his troops (and African 
mercenaries) (Patrick, 2011). Indeed Pape, who has asserted R2P's standards are too permissive, 
argued just cause had been met even prior to the Benghazi crisis, by his own stringent threshold of a 
minimum of 2,000 deaths to justify intervention, in addition to a clear refugee crisis (2012: 63). 
However, it has been argued that despite just cause for the initial intervention, the severity of the 
situation “did not seem to be serious enough to provide just cause for regime change” (Pattison, 
2011b: 2). One should recall that Nardin specifically stated intervention justified in preventing 
'imminent' atrocities would not permit full-scale war, but to 'control' a regime without overthrowing 
it (2013: 79). Pattison shows the drastic nature of regime change ensures it's justification would 
have to be “more serious than that is required for humanitarian intervention to be permissible” 
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(2011b: 2), a threshold argued as not met in Libya (Ibid). Pattison therefore proposes that 
determinations of just cause should be applied at various stages of an intervention (2011b: 4). This 
stipulation adds to the 'nuances' and 'caveats' which justify or illegitimate regime change in the 
theoretical literature. The assertion regarding insufficient just cause will now be addressed.
As the the threat to Benghazi was the 'trigger' for intervention, these discussions part rely on what 
'may' have occurred. It is noted that Gadaffi's aggressive language did him 'no favours', and the 
Obama administration forcefully argued the potential atrocities would “stain the conscience of the 
world” (Graubart, 2013: 85). However, fears of an imminent massacre may have been debatable, as 
Gadaffi had not committed atrocities on such a scale in other cities he had retaken (Ibid). 
Furthermore, Kuperman shows Gadaffi's threats were directed at rebels, not civilians, leading him 
to describe Obama's assertion that intervention would be 'preventing genocide' to be a severe 
overstatement (2011). This is an intrinsic problem of counter-factual evidence, as it can always be 
disputed, but legitimises coercive action regardless (Chandler, 2006: 73). 
Resultantly, various commentators argued there was not sufficient cause for an intervention, let 
alone regime change. Walzer argued military intervention is only 'defensible' in the most extreme 
cases, and argues whilst there may have been repression following a Gadaffi victory, it could not 
justify intervention (2011b)1. Furthermore, regime change in this context, “has to be local work, and 
in this case, sadly, the locals couldn’t do it” (Walzer, 2011b). Rory Stewart recognised Gadaffi was 
not committing atrocities commensurate with crisis's such as Bosnia (2011b). Resultantly, Graubart 
argues the intervention relied on 'dramatic' claims regarding Gadaffi's regime and exaggerated fears 
of 'imminent' atrocities (Graubart, 2013: 85). These arguments would support Pattison's argument 
that atrocities were not on the scale necessarily to make Gadaffi's regime a 'legitimate candidate' for 
forcible overthrow. 
1  His position is somewhat questionable, as he had previously argued a pre-emptive strike to prevent “a probably fatal 
and credibly imminent attack might be justified.” (Nardin, 2013: 79)
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However, whilst these points are due consideration, advocates of the intervention argue the 
threshold demanded by Walzer “arbitrarily sets the bar extremely high for intervention” (Nardin, 
2013: 76). Furthermore, prior to Benghazi, Gadaffi's actions had been described as amounting to 
crimes against humanity (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 840). R2P's stipulation regarding 'imminent' 
atrocities recognised the impracticality of 'waiting' for massacres to occur, and Libya met R2P's 
threshold for intervening (Pattison, 2011b: 2). Additionally, Chivvis accepts the severity of 
atrocities in Benghazi may not have been as high as the interveners claim, he shows they could have 
easily topped the 8,000 killed in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre (2012: 11). Bellamy indeed argues 
Gadaffi's record and aggressive language ensured, “states could not plausibly argue that the threat of 
mass atrocities was not real [or imminent]” (2011b: 267). 
This debate reveals a major issue in utilising R2P to judge the legitimacy of regime change. In 
addition to the existing debate regarding thresholds, there is now a debate over 'just cause' for 
actions within a 'just' intervention. This argument may be sound ethically, but complicated to apply. 
If intervention supposedly prevented the regime committing atrocities upon its people, it cannot be 
practically or politically justified to then limit the interveners actions to ill-defined 'control' over the 
regime. This analysis raises an issue with the existing literature, and evidence suggesting the regime 
change in Libya may not be justifiable. The following section addresses the question of intentions 
and motives, and whether regime change was the primary intention of intervening.
Intent and Motive
The intervener's intentions in Libya are heavily debated. Critics have questioned whether the 
intention was “predominantly the protection of civilians – a humanitarian objective – or the removal 
of Gadaffi” (Pattison, 2011b: 3). In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that to be justified, the 
primary intention of an intervention must be the ending of atrocities. Thus, if it can be proven the 
intervener's intention was regime change from the outset, they would be suspect. However, recalling 
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the caveats to this position, if the primary intention was addressing the humanitarian crisis, regime 
change could be accordingly justified as necessary in fulfilling this humanitarian mandate. In view 
of criticism based on this criteria, it is a crucial determinant of the intervention's justifiability. 
A Trojan Horse?
An early criticism of the intervention was the lack of specific goals beyond the initial rescue of 
Benghazi (Chatham House, 2011: 1). As the intervention progressed, critics viewed supposed 
attempts to enact regime change as evidence that the primary intention had always been to 
overthrow Gadaffi, a fact “obscured by the hullabaloo over the supposedly imminent massacre at 
Benghazi” (Roberts, 2011). Critics highlight the calls by Western leaders for Gadaffi to step down 
as evidence of this intention, and Downes believes the op-ed article clarified the, “objective is 
regime change rather than simply protecting civilians” (Downes, 2011). Politically, the interveners 
had become committed to this outcome, and Rory Stewart MP shows the perception was if  Gadaffi 
was not overthrown, it would signify the intervention had failed (2012: xi).
Some of R2P's foremost advocates notably voiced similar concerns (Evans et al, 2013: 206). Evans 
and Thakur question whether the primary goal of the intervention remained civillian protection 
throughout (Ibid). They show the rejection of ceasefire proposals which “may have been serious” 
(Ibid), strikes on military targets of seemingly no threat to civilians, and arms supply to the rebels 
all demonstrated the interveners were “unequivocally committed to the rebel side, and to securing 
regime change” (Evans, 2011: 41). This shift led Evans & Thakur to argue the intervention did not 
remain “a textbook R2P case for its duration” (2013: 206), and “stretched its [R2P] mandate to the 
absolute limit, and maybe beyond it” (Evans, 2011: 41).
Several factors are presented as proof of this intention. Firstly, the aforementioned exceeding of the 
UN mandate, which Falk argued demonstrated not commitment to the intervention human 
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protection goals, but “to ensuring that the balance of forces be tipped in the direction of the 
insurrection” (Falk, 2011). This is particularly controversial, as it contravened the UN mandate, and 
also R2P, which stipulates “the advancement of a particular combatant group’s claim to self-
determination, cannot be justified” (ICISS, 2011: 51). Indeed, NATO's 'unequivocal' support for the 
rebels strengthened the charge NATO had intervened “on behalf of one side in a civil war and 
pursued regime change” (Thakur, 2011: 4). The supply of arms to the rebels was equally 
controversial, and the “most evident departure from the spirit [of human protection] of resolution 
1973” (Eyal, 2012: 60). Lastly, the specific targeting of Gadaffi, was a clear, cynical effort of 
instantaneous regime change, clearly unjustifiable under the Resolution's human protection mandate 
(Thakur, 2011: 3). 
This raises the distinct sceptre of 'motives' and national interests. As there had been similar crisis's 
in Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, Pattison shows these questions are inevitable, as the West had “chosen 
to act in the less serious case, where fewer lives are likely to be saved” bringing into question the 
intervention's 'moral justifiability' (2011b: 6). Graubart argues there was a 'strong national interest' 
in opposing the Libyan regime and asserting influence on the insurgency and the Arab Spring as a 
whole (2013: 87). These criticisms represent a major problem with justifying the regime change, as 
an intention of regime change cannot be justified under R2P. However, such perspectives are not 
universal, as will be demonstrated
Primary Intention?
However, whilst regime change may have became a goal of the intervention, the human protection 
mandate is argued to have been the initial intention, and arguably remained it's primary aim. 
Recalling Teson's distinctions that intent is the 'contemplated act', we can distinguish between the 
actual military action and the intervener's motivation to pressure Gadaffi's regime. Eyal shows there 
is no evidence that regime change was the intention from the outset, but much evidence that the 
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intervention began as a “culmination of a process which exhausted all other peaceful means, and a 
measured response to a genuine, immediate humanitarian crisis” (Eyal, 2012: 56). The calls for a 
no-fly zone and risk to Benghazi were voiced not solely by Western states, but major figures in the 
UN and crucially, regional organisations such as the LAS and GCC, thus the intervention was not 
'manipulated' into being as a remit for regime change (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 843). 
Indeed, Pattison shows every indication was the initial intention had been civilian protection, as if 
regime change been the primary and initial goal the intervener's would have immediately extended 
attacks to all of Libya and provided immediate direct support to the rebels (2011b: 3). There would 
also have been far less regard for civilian casualties or damage to civillian infrastructure (Chivvis, 
2012: 10). Pape concludes that in contrast to other examples, the Libyan intervention “did not 
constitute a serious program of foreign-imposed regime change” (2012: 69), with little evidence of 
“a comprehensive, systematic effort to decapitate the Libyan regime” (Ibid). Whilst the intervener's 
may have initially hoped the no-fly zone would have pressured the regime to leave, that political 
goal is distinct from their intention in intervening. 
Indeed, critics over-stressed Western leader's calls for Gadaffi to step down, conflating them with 
the intervention's intent. Rory Stewart demonstrates this issue, showing that in arguing the no-fly 
zone is humanitarian and not about regime change, but also saying Gadaffi needs to step down; he 
was accused of 'falling between two stools' in this supposed contradiction (2011b). Stewart 
distinguishes between advocating military measures for humanitarian aims (i.e. protecting civilians 
through intervention), and civilian measures for political aims (condemnation and sanctions to 
pressure the Gadaffi regime) (Ibid). Indeed, if one is to take political discourses as seriously as 
critics do, it is clear that leader's references to the resolution overwhelmingly focussed on human 
protection and disavowed regime change as the primary intention (Hall, 2011; House of Commons, 
2011). In the op-ed piece on April 14th which signified regime change as the end-goal, this was 
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presented as a continuation of protecting civilians (Obama et al. 2011). This evidence could 
therefore be the basis for justifying regime change as an extension of protecting civilians
There is little evidence of ulterior motives on the part of the interveners, Bellamy and Williams 
seeing little proof to support such an interpretation (2011: 848). Indeed, R2P stipulates some level 
of interests are inevitable, but those present in this case are relatively benign, being addressal of a 
threat to regional stability and a refugee crisis on Europe’s border (Patrick, 2011b). Furthermore, 
prior to the crisis the West enjoyed a positive relationship with Gadaffi benefiting their national 
interests, supporting the rebels put these benefits at risk (Pape, 2012: 62). The splits in the Obama 
administration over the intervention's relevance to US interests is further evidence of no interest-
based motivation, as Defence Secretary Robert Gates and National Security Adviser Thomas 
Donilon sought reduce US involvement as much as possible (Thakur, 2011: 3). 
A 'Shift' in Objectives?
However, whilst it can be argued the original intention of the intervention was human protection, it 
arguably 'morphed' into one of regime change. In terms of end-goals, Resolution 1973 did not 
provide “a clear military solution” (Chatham House, 2011: 2) and further action authorisation was 
unlikely (Ibid). The April 14th op-ed publication was indicative of a shift in long term aims. 
Following the initial defence of Benghazi, political considerations ensured the interveners could not 
allow Gadaffi to re-establish control, the subsequent 'mission creep' meant the long term objective 
merged with removing Gadaffi (Pattison, 2011b: 4). This 'shift' could be justifiable under R2P, as 
the previous chapter demonstrated that in fulfilling a humanitarian mandate, 'disabling' the regime 
may be just and necessary, which in the context of a civil war, essentially meant regime change. 
This is indeed why the mandate's escalation was argued to be necessary. The op-ed argued regime 
change was the only way to ensure the long term end to the humanitarian crisis (Obama et al., 
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2011). In the short term, it was argued the pursuit of this goal was necessary to protect civilians in 
the areas under Gadaffi's control (Evans, 2011: 41). This 'shift' is problematic to clearly legitimise 
regardless, as regime change had indeed become a goal of the intervention, and ensured the 
intervention took sides in a civil war. In analysing these competing claims, the next section will 
assess whether regime change could indeed be viewed as a practical necessity Libya's case.
Means
The practical consideration that the regime would have to be removed, as the regime was the party 
committing atrocities, has significant force. Rieff recalled his earlier point to demonstrate that 
“proponents must recognize that in the midst of rebellions such as the one in Libya, people cannot 
be protected without regime change” (2011). Indeed, as the intervention progressed with no solution 
to the crisis available, the human protection mandate could not be fulfilled, “without targeting, 
weakening and ultimately changing the behaviour of the regime” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 848). 
This section will evaluate whether the regime change in Libya could be theoretically legitimised 
through these practical considerations.
A 'Natural Extension'?
As the justification for intervention was in this case the regime committing atrocities against it's 
people, Gadaffi's removal was a natural extension of protecting civilians, as his purported intentions 
and shelling of civillian areas meant “by enforcing a regime change, NATO would remove the 
greatest threat on the Libyan civilians, Gadaffi” (Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013: 168). Patrick 
argues that to have met the R2P criteria 'reasonable chance of success', the intervention clearly 
depended on Gadaffi's removal “for the humanitarian crisis, civil war to stop, and rebuilding to 
begin” (2011). Therefore, Hipold argues that regime change “was not an immediate goal of the 
operation but eventually inevitable” (2012: 76). 
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Indeed, many commentators saw Gadaffi remaining in power as the worst possible outcome of the 
intervention, both politically and in humanitarian terms. As this would lead to inevitable repression, 
and a civil war of great humanitarian cost, it represents the “severest danger” (Joshi, 2011). These 
long term considerations demonstrate the importance of post-conflict, R2R considerations, as the 
responsibility to ensure a long-term end of atrocities had been placed upon the intervener, in 
addressing the 'root causes' of the crisis (Nardin, 2013: 77). Thus, in view of Gadaffi's 'murderous 
intentions', it was considered necessary to go beyond 'rescue' and ensure civilians in protected areas 
“will not be murdered if his regime survives” (Nardin, 2013: 75). These long term considerations 
show it was difficult to see how human protection could be achieved without regime change.
This argument is indeed logical, however Evans (whom as a foremost advocate of R2P has his 
reasons to not associate R2P with a controversial regime change) recognises this fact, but argues it 
should have been left to the rebels to do, citing the limitations of the UN mandate (Evans, 2011: 
41). Indeed, many commentators argued there were alternatives to forceful regime change, which 
requires addressal if assertions Gadaffi had to go are to be proven; this will be addressed in the next 
chapter. However, as Evans questioned whether the intervention's application had shifted from 
protecting civilians to imposing regime change (Evans, 2013: 206), justifying a 'natural extension' 
under R2P, would require the continued 'primary intention' of human protection to be fulfilled, 
which will now be analysed. 
Appropriate Methods?
With regard to the methods utilised, it was argued the no-fly zone may be insufficient to facilitate 
regime change and avoid a prolonged civil war (Chatham House, 2011: 1). Stewart accordingly 
expressed concern for the risk of 'mission creep' and riskier potential strategies (2012: xiv). 
However, the general measures utilised were consistent with the limited objective of human 
protection (Thakur, 2011: 3). Indeed, Payandeh argues that by-and-large, the outcome of regime 
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change was a consequence of measures taken to protect the civillian population, and “a strict 
distinction between the objective of human rights protection and measures that might lead to regime 
change cannot be upheld” (2012: 389). Doubts regarding the commitment to a humanitarian intent 
are therefore somewhat unfounded, and Labonte shows that with hindsight, the intervention was 
“effective in delivering on civilian protection as envisioned by R2P” (2012: 991).
Williams and Popken demonstrated that the robust application of the mandate in Libya was the 
reason why it was effective in protecting civilians (2011: 226). They note interventions are often 
“handicapped by narrow legal mandates and weak implementation.” (Ibid). In contrast, the 
resolution's stipulation of 'all necessary measures' shifted away from formerly 'toothless' campaigns 
and could therefore effectively prevent Gadaffi's forces killing civilians (Williams & Popken, 2011: 
236). To demonstrate this point, they cite Bosnia, where an unwillingness to use force led to an 
abject failure in protecting civilians (Ibid). Indeed, the measures in Libya ensured “the ability of the 
state to perpetrate mass atrocity crimes was steadily eroded between March and September 2011” 
(Labonte 2012: 991). Furthermore, this was accomplished without significant collateral damage on 
either Libya's population or major infrastructure, further indicating the primary intention remained 
both humanitarian, with consideration of the long term implications of that mandate (Chivvis, 2012: 
10).
However, criticism of more questionable measures is however relevant. Supplying the rebels with 
arms could only spuriously be justified as speeding a resolution to the conflict and not justifiably by 
R2P (Eyal, 2012: 61). Whilst targeting Gadaffi's forces not threatening civilians may be justified as 
disabling his capacity to commit abuses, targeting Gadaffi specifically cannot be an appropriate or 
legal measure (Thakur, 2011: 3). The levels to which the intervener's provided direct air support for 
the rebels also reinforced assertions the intervention had merged into taking sides in a civil war, 
which blurs the protection mandate and 'stretches' the concept of R2P (Evans, 2011: 41).
48
Thus whilst the intervener's could therefore justify removing Gadaffi under R2P, 'taking sides' is 
more problematic. Even if the no-fly zone remained focussed on human protection, it increasingly 
did so in concert with direct support for the rebels. Whilst it is argued this support was a by-product 
of more legitimate goals, which provided safe-zones for the rebels to become organised and execute 
their campaign (Pape, 2012: 69), this support later became more direct. Chandler shows supporting 
regime change was posed as “enabling and facilitating [the Libyan people] in the process of 
securing themselves” (2012: 221). Pape argues these actions were justifiable, as building Libyan 
capacity ensured that ”Libyans and not foreign powers would decide Gadaffi's fate” (Pape, 2012: 
68). However, this remains a controversial extension of R2P, and led to ambiguity in judging 
intentions and strategic goals. 
To summarise, it can be determined that regime change could have been viewed as a necessary goal 
in achieving the humanitarian mandate. However, the means utilised blurred the distinction between 
protecting civilians and taking sides in a civil war. This blur demonstrates the difficulties of 
'disabling' a regime, as the legitimacy of doing so is open to interpretation. The next chapter will 
assess whether regime change was the only means in resolving the crisis, to demonstrate the 
practical limitations of R2P on this issue. Prior to this, is analysis of Libya's humanitarian outcomes.
Outcomes
In applying the outcomes orientated approach to Libya, the intervention can be justified more 
clearly. In spite of claims the military measures would be insufficient, the intervention had indeed 
protected civilians and removed the abusive regime without needing to commit ground troops 
(Patrick, 2011). The intervention achieved all of its objectives, facilitated humanitarian relief and 
effectively protected the civilian population (Chivvis, 2012: 10). Doing so without damaging 
Libya's vital infrastructure would also facilitate post-war reconstruction efforts (Ibid). Without the 
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intervention, Gadaffi would have likely committed atrocities in Benghazi, and enacted retribution in 
rebel cities after re-asserting control (Thakur, 2011: 3). 
By ending the civil war, the intervention prevented further test and a long term humanitarian crisis 
(Western and Golstein, 2011: 57). Despite the political ramifications of the 'stretched' mandates of 
both R2P and the Resolution, these outcomes-based perspectives show that it cannot be doubted the 
intervention saved lives (Pattison, 2011b: 7). Scholars may argue facilitate in the removal of Gadaffi 
was clearly a beneficial outcome, and the most definitive political solution (Daalder & Stavridis, 
2012). As a result, Thakur argues the 'euphoria' of the Libyan people and military success of the 
campaign can “temper criticism of the manner in which NATO rode roughshod over UN 
authorisation to protect civilians”  (2011: 4). Such assertions indicate regardless of the principled 
objections, Libya could be justified on the basis of humanitarian outcomes.
From minimalist perspectives, the post-conflict context could also be regarded as positive, as the 
interveners did not subsequently impose control over Libya, fitting with Chandlers purported post-
interventionist paradigm (Chandler, 2012: 221). Slaughter indeed demonstrated it was not up to the 
West to plan Libya's transition (2012). One may recall the example of Bangladesh, where the 
population was 'unified' and able to rebuild itself, Libya was similarly unified following it's self-
liberation, buoyed with a largely intact infrastructure. Furthermore, as the rebels were against any 
'stabilisation force' or extensive nation-building, Maximalist criticism is questionable (Chivvis, 
2012: 10). As Chivvis shows, the military action left Libya's future in the hand of the Libyan's 
themselves (Ibid). Most importantly in judging the post-conflict context is the fact atrocities have 
not recurred.
Summary
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Libya is clearly a complicated case in which to judge the legitimacy of regime change. This is part 
due to the abstract legitimising conditions identifiable in academic literature and R2P, which are 
difficult to apply in practise. Indeed, whilst in a strict legal sense, the intervention could not be 
justified, the wide remit of 'all necessary measures' arguably justified a pursuit of regime change, to 
fulfil the mandate of protecting the civilian population. Whilst this could be legitimate under R2P, 
and was the justification provided by the interveners, it is difficult to ascertain whether regime 
change was indeed in the pursuit of a humanitarian mandate, or an intention in of itself. 
This case demonstrates the difficulty of judging intentions, as separating the intervener's political 
goals and statements, with their actual intent is difficult to prove. As the intervention indeed 
morphed into direct support for the rebels in a civil war, it would be a 'stretch' to justify it under 
R2P. Though in the context of this civil war, a legitimate 'disabling' of Gadaffi' forces would ensure 
regime change by default. 
In view of the difficulties in gauging whether the intervention is justified by the abstract theoretical 
literature, the next chapter will assess whether regime change was indeed a necessity, by analysing 
the alternatives, before situating the evidence gather in this chapter in the wider debate over regime 
change.
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Chapter 3: The Only Solution?
As the intervention is difficult to justify through the standards purported in the academic literature, 
this chapter assesses what alternatives existed to the facilitation of forceful regime change, before 
demonstrating the implications of the Libyan intervention on the R2P norm. This evidence 
demonstrates limits in the academic literature in approaching the issue of regime change.
In determining alternatives to forceful regime change in Libya, two paths can be identified which 
were advocated. First, was a negotiated solution; Second was a call to leave the rebels to fight their 
own war and pursue the mandate in a more limited fashion. These alternatives will be explored. 
A Negotiated Solution 
Negotiations were purported as the most appropriate solution to the conflict as it would immediately 
stop the humanitarian crisis non-violently, and not bring controversy upon R2P. The UN resolution 
had called for an immediate ceasefire and the beginning of a 'political process' (Graubart, 2013: 82). 
However, this alternative was regarded to require Gadaffi's exit from power to be approved by the 
rebels (Chatham House, 2011:1). Such a solution proved intractable, and also represents regime 
change regardless. 
This solution was advocated by many states, with China arguing the crisis must be solved 
peacefully, and Germany similarly showing the aim of the intervention should be to “stop the 
violence and begin a true political process” (UN Security Council, 2011). However, critics charge 
that the prospect of negotiations was never taken seriously by the interveners and Graubart shows 
when Resolution 1973 was passed, Gadaffi promptly announced a ceasefire and proposed political 
dialogue, which was rejected by NATO and the National Transitional Council (NTC) (2013: 82). 
All subsequent ceasefire proposals from Gaddafi or the African Union – on 30 April, 26 May and 9 
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June – were also rejected (Ibid). Milne argued that if the primary intention was to 'stop the killing', 
the intervener's should have backed such proposals, rather than vetoing them (2011). Indeed, 
following a stalemate in the conflict, the Italian President called for a ceasefire, but President 
Sarkozy instead made clear “we must continue until Mr. Gaddafi leaves” (Birnbaum, 2011). Critics 
believe the intervener's had 'demonised' Gadaffi, rendering possible negotiations unpalatable and 
'banishing' Gadaffi from political discourse “never to be negotiated with” (Roberts, 2011).
However, these assertions are problematic. Firstly, Gadaffi's initial offer of a ceasefire was 
immediately broken when he violated it by continuing his attack on Benghazi (Al Jazeera, 2011b). 
Following this initial episode, negotiations were rendered impossible by the positions of both the 
regime and the rebels. Chatham House shows there was a lack of trust between the two sides, who 
“both still think they can win” (2011: 9). Both sides also had pre-conditions for any ceasefire which 
could not be met, notably the rebels demand that Gadaffi immediately step down (Ibid). This was an 
“absolute minimum precondition” (Chivvis, 2012: 8) for negotiations. Chivvis shows the 
interveners did not rule out a negotiated settlement, although politically Gadaffi's departure was 
necessary in some form (Ibid). Those who argue the interveners should have 'accepted' a ceasefire 
do not consider the rebel's position. 
Indeed, 'multiple efforts' to create a ceasefire and subsequent negotiations failed (Chivvis, 2012: 8). 
The arguments regarding the demonisation of Gadaffi were correct to some extent, as the 
interveners could hardly allow the regime purported to have committed atrocities to dictate Libya's 
political future, let alone retain power, or risk perceptions of a “humiliating retreat” (Downes, 
2011).  One must also recall that the UN-sanctioned ICC investigation had issued an arrest warrant 
for Gadaffi in June, which complicated any prospect of giving up power, and was referred to as 
complicating any prospect for a negotiated settlement by the African Union (BBC News, 2011d). 
Therefore, when it was clear dialogue would not yield results, Payaneh argues the intervener's 
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began to “consider regime change a necessary prerequisite for the protection of civilians and 
civilian populated areas in Libya” (Payandeh, 2012: 389). Negotiations were an ideal, but 
seemingly unattainable solution, with Gadaffi unwilling to step down as per rebel demands. 
Allowing Gadaffi to remain in power was a political impossibility. 
'Leave them to fight their own war' 
This perspective argued the intervention in Libya should have been more limited. It is argued this 
would have prevented diplomatic fallout regarding the controversial manner in which the 
intervention was carried out (Evans, 2011b: 41). However, such a proposal – just as in negotiation – 
would have still needed to end with regime change.
These positions assert that the intervention should have stuck strictly to its limited mandate, not 
directly supported the rebels and stopped short of “full war-fighting” (Ibid). Despite the assertions 
that civilians would only be safe without Gadaffi, it is argued civilians could have been protected 
without 'third parties' dictating the domestic political struggle (Welsh, 2011: 6). Indeed, recall 
Pattison's argument there was not just cause for regime change.
Therefore Evans argued that whilst regime change was arguably justified as an extension of 
protecting civilians, it would have been preferable to have conducted the intervention on a 
restrained basis. This would ensure the exercise was more legitimate, and put less 'stress on R2P 
(2011b: 42). He shows this could have been done by maintaining the no fly zone and restricting 
strikes to concentrations of forces clearly putting civilians at risk (Evans, 2011b: 41). Gadaffi could 
then have been pressured into leaving through rebel military pressure, international/regional 
pressure and sanctions (Ibid). Pattison similarly argued that without 'cause' to forcibly remove 
Gadaffi, non-violent measures such as sanctions were preferred (2011b: 4). 
It is argued this approach would have better preserved the 'integrity' of R2P, which is Evan's 
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primary interest (2011c). However, he admits that in following these recommendations, it would 
have “undoubtedly have led to a more protracted, probably messier war with even more casualties, 
and harder domestic politics” (Ibid). Such proposals are ethically problematic. 
Indeed, the main issue with this 'alternative' is there would be no guarantee that these suggestions 
would have resolved the crisis at all. Chatham House warned that the limited means authorised in 
the intervention risked stalemate, whereby Gadaffi would recover with the opposition unable to 
make progress, leading to intractable conflict (2011: 1). This stalemate could then have created a 
de-facto partition between an East-Libyan UN protectorate, and West Libya under Gadaffi's control, 
far from an ideal solution (Ibid). 
Such outcomes would be politically disastrous, and Evans himself recognises that a longer term 
conflict could have been “politically impossible to sustain in the US and Europe” (Evans, 2012). As 
Patrick astutely noted, such limited action would have violated the R2P principles of reasonable 
chances of success, and the creation of a long term conflict would have meant the original 
intervention caused more harm than it solved, one of the criticisms levelled at the prospect of 
regime change in Libya (Pattison, 2011b: 4) which did not manifest itself. 
Thus, the potential alternatives to the Libyan intervention were by no means ideal. They may have 
actually led to a long-term, intractable humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, such a politically 
disastrous outcome would surely not have protected R2P, but condemned it a more deleterious 
manner. 
Whilst regime change in Libya is difficult to justify in the academic literature and led to a 
diplomatic backlash, it was practically the most expedient solution in ending the humanitarian crisis 
and civil war. Rieff may have been proven right in asserting proponents of the intervention, like 
Evans, did not precipitate the necessity of such an outcome (2011). The aforementioned political 
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connotations of the intervention will now be assessed , in determining the implications of regime 
change in Libya.
Diplomatic Lessons
The pronounced diplomatic fallout following Libya has emphasised the controversial nature of 
regime change. It is asserted R2P has been 'tarnished' by its association with regime change, not 
only in Libya, but also the Ivory Coast (Lynch, 2011). Evans and Thakur argue any consensus 
regarding R2P has been “damaged by gaps in expectation, communication, and accountability 
between those who mandated the operation and those who executed it” (Evans et al., 2013: 206). 
Indeed, China and Russia were clearly displeased with how the intervention was undertaken, which 
was argued to be a potential “barrier to implementation of the responsibility to protect elsewhere” 
(Ulfstein & Christiansen, 2013:170). Such fears were realised by the current crisis in Syria, where 
the unauthorised regime change in Libya has supposedly led to Russia's refusal to allow any 
Security Council action regarding the atrocities in Syria (Chivvis, 2012: 10). 
However, despite the supposed consensus that Libya put R2P on it's “death knell” (Dunne, 2012), 
some scholars see such claims as exaggerated. The ongoing citing of R2P in the UN regarding 
crisis's since Libya demonstrate its continued influence (Ibid). Indeed, Lynch believes that the Libya 
precedent has, at worst, given China and Russia an excuse to justify opposing international action in 
Syria (2011). The blocking of action in Syria is more a cynical protection of a Russian ally, which 
would have occurred even without the Libyan controversy (Chivvis, 2012: 12). Indeed, fears that 
2011's 'consensus' on R2P were ended by Libya, overstate the extent to which such a consensus 
existed (Lynch, 2011), as the Libyan and Ivory Coast interventions were authorised by the Security 
Council due to other factors, particularly regional organisations acting as 'gatekeepers' to 
intervention, without which Russia and China would surely have vetoed (Bellamy & Williams, 
2011: 845). 
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Summary
Whilst the 'end' of R2P may have been exaggerated, it is true that in the short-medium term 
intervention may be less likely. Furthermore, as these perceptions have gravely damaged 
perceptions of the Libyan intervention, it is safe to assert regime change casts a shadow of 
illegitimacy over an intervention, particularly as humanitarian intent and motives become very 
difficult to prove. 
Whilst regime change may have been necessary in Libya, in light of few viable political or practical 
alternatives, Eyal shows the collection of issues such as supplying arms, taking sides and aggressive 
political rhetoric ensured critics had enough evidence to throw doubt over the legitimacy of the 
intervention as a whole (2011: 61). Indeed, regardless of the justifications for regime change, the 
necessity of its application ensured it could have never been a 'perfect example' of R2P.
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Conclusion
The facilitation of regime change in Libya has certainly demonstrated it's capacity to 'haunt' the 
concept of humanitarian intervention. This analysis demonstrates regime change is difficult to 
justify within the academic literature, and even more difficult to apply such justifications in 
practise. 
The theoretical issues raised by this analysis require further research. Pattison's stipulation of a 
second 'layer' of just cause adds to an already difficult debate over the thresholds of R2P. The 
difficulty in distinguishing intent also demonstrates that justifications of any regime change will be 
ambiguous at best, as it need to be proven that the primary intention is in ending a humanitarian 
crisis. Indeed, if these arguments are so, one could ask how serious the atrocities in Libya would 
have needed to be in justifying regime change? These assertions may sound justified in theory, but 
their difficulty in application demonstrates these concerns cannot be addressed by abstract theory.
Indeed, in situations where the government is the party committing atrocities, such considerations 
ignore the reality that if a situation is severe enough to warrant intervention, restrictions on the 
intervener's permitted end-goals ignores the political and practical reality that these regime's will 
need to be changed in some form. Whilst Bellamy called for a distinction to be made between R2P 
and regime change (2011), in 'classic' humanitarian intervention, these distinctions will be difficult 
to make. 
Of course, not all contexts necessitate regime change per say, but as Trim demonstrates, if there was 
no imperative to change a regime's policy then there would be no imperative to intervene in the first 
place (Trim, 2011: 393). Furthermore, if an intervener takes their commitment to the post-conflict 
context seriously, they would have to ensure the atrocities would not recur following an 
intervention, which in a situation like Libya, inevitably means some manner of regime change. 
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In ensuring R2P is not implicated by the regime change in Libya and the Ivory Coast, some scholars 
have suggested it should be 'forgotten' by the doctrine, and R2P should re-emphasise its non-
military elements, such as conflict prevention (Western & Goldstein, 2013). However, such 
measures would merely 'hide' from the issue, and if R2P is applied in a future situation where a 
government is committing abuses against it's people, the same problems will re-emerge. 
Indeed, analysis of regime change indicates that a hypothetical intervention in Syria may indeed be 
something proponents of R2P may not want to pursue, as the complicated situation on the ground 
and harsh Western condemnation of Assad, may mean any intervention would have no clear end 
goals outside of regime change. Arbour demonstrates that an intervention could not credibly purport 
to protect Syria's people otherwise (2013). This also demonstrates that as the motivations of many 
Syrian rebels are at best questionable, facilitating such a group may instantly replace Assad's regime 
with extremist elements, and the potential for future problems.
With regard to Libya, whilst the justifications for regime change were at best 'stretched' and at worst 
cover for an intention to facilitate regime change, it cannot be doubted that it also protected 
civilians in the short term, and ended the humanitarian crisis in the long term. The regime change 
was illegal and difficult to justify through R2P, but it may have been practically justified.
Whilst the implications for R2P may still prove to be costly, regime change was preferable over the 
alternatives of a limited intervention, or false hopes for negotiations, both of which would have led 
to stalemate, and most certainly more deaths. Whilst facilitated regime change had its own 
consequences, these considerations prove it may have also been necessary. In all decisions related to 
humanitarian intervention, there are rarely good solutions, just the 'least-bad' one, as Slaughter states, 
“welcome to the tough choices of  foreign policy in the 21st century. Libya proves the west can make 
those choices wisely after all” (2011).
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